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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model to characterize the discriminatory behavior of a
non-complying firm in a minimum-wage economy. In the analysis, the violating firm pays
one “favored” group of workers the statutory minimum and the other “non-favored” group of
workers a sub-minimum. We find conditions under which law enforcement is ineffective in
improving the between-group wage differentials. We show that an increase in the minimum
wage raises the sub-minimum wage and employment of workers in the non-favored group,
but reduces the employment of workers in the favored group. The effect of the minimum
wage increase on total employment is unambiguously negative, however.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), considerable attention has been 
paid to analyzing issues related to compliance with and enforcement of the minimum wage law.  
Of particular concern is the effect of enforcement intensity on sub-minimum wage and 
employment level.  Interestingly, contrasting results regarding the effect of minimum wage law 
enforcement have been found in the literature.  Given the objective of a minimum wage policy, 
how important is enforcement in making the policy successful?  What is the effect of law 
enforcement on the employment decisions of the non-complying employers subject to the 
minimum wage law?  Answers to these questions are important considerations in any such policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple model for analyzing the employment effect of 
partial compliance with the minimum wage law.  Specifically, we discuss partial compliance that 
arises from the case in which a firm pays a “favored” group of workers the statutory minimum 
and the other “non-favored” group of workers a sub-minimum.  We wish to examine how 
minimum wage increases and law enforcement intensity affect the sub-minimum wage and the 
composition of workers in different demographic groups, as well as the employment of all the 
workers taken together. 
Chang and Ehrlich (1985) develop a model of minimum wage compliance and show that 
the effectiveness of the law depends crucially on the size of deterring monetary sanctions upon 
the employment decision of a violating firm.  In their analysis, the labor market for minimum-
wage workers is assumed to be characterized by perfect competition.  Yaniv (1988) examines 
how a firm’s decision to comply with the minimum wage law changes with different minimum 
wages and corresponding degrees of enforcement for the case of monopsony.  The author 
contends that partial enforcement may reduce the gap between minimum wage and sub-
minimum wage in a monopsonistic labor market.  Yaniv (2001) examines the “portfolio-choice” 
of a non-complying employer who pays a minimum wage to one subset of workers and a sum-
minimum wage to another subset of workers.  He shows that partial compliance may reduce total 
employment down to the level equivalent to the negative employment effect of full compliance.  
Yaniv (2004) further finds that minimum wage laws can only improve the market situation, from 
the standpoint of labor suppliers, if they have strong enforcement polices to complement them.  
Otherwise, workers may be better off without a minimum wage law.   
Law enforcement is an important component of any government regulation.  Past 
literature shows that, in a situation where a minimum wage law is not properly enforced, the 
existing market wage rate is positively related to the minimum wage.  Basu, Chau, and Kanbur 
(2005) develop a monopsonistic labor market model to simultaneously determine the minimum 
wage and degree of enforcement.  They find that the sub-minimum wage is endogenously 
determined given the minimum wage and that a higher minimum wage leads to greater 
enforcement efforts.   
  In one sense, a minimum wage law is a tool used by governments to curb any kind of 
discrimination in the labor market.  Using the notions of monopsony and employer wage 
discrimination (Robinson, 1969; Becker, 1971) and adding a component of risk, Tobol (2005) 
examines how making labor discrimination illegal affects the wage differential in either 
monopolistic or competitive markets.  He finds that a high degree of enforcement can reduce or 
eliminate discrimination in a monopolistic setup.  However, a high degree of enforcement is 
counter-effective in competitive markets.  High enforcement increases the risk of getting caught 




group.  In contrast to Tobol (2005), our model shows that under certain conditions law 
enforcement can be totally ineffective in competitive markets.  Ransom and Boal (1997) show 
that the main determinant of the effect of minimum wage law on total employment level is the 
market labor supply curve whereas the level of exploitation in a given firm is determined by the 
firm’s labor supply curve.  Bhaskar, Manning, and To (2004) find conditions under which the 
impact of minimum wage law on total employment increases in the level of oligopsony power in 
a labor market. 
In this paper, we pay particular attention to the case of partial compliance with the 
minimum wage law due to wage discrimination.  As in Yaniv (2001), we assume that a non-
complying firm chooses to pay a sub-minimum wage to a subset of employed workers.  The firm 
thus divides its labor stock “between risky and non-risky employment” (Yaniv 2001, p. 597).  
But unlike Yaniv, we assume that noncompliance decision arises from the employer’s “taste for 
discrimination” (Becker, 1957) and discriminatory monopsony (Robinson, 1969).  We wish to 
examine the effectiveness of minimum wage enforcement in reducing the wage gap between 
different demographic groups of workers.  Our results show that, given a minimum wage 
economy in which firms hire two types of workers, weak law enforcement is ineffective in 
improving the between-group wage differentials.  We then look at the effects of minimum wage 
increases on the sub-minimum wage and employment levels of two distinct worker groups.  We 
find that increases in minimum wage have a positive effect on the sub-minimum wages of 
workers subject to discrimination, as well as their employment.  However, minimum wage 
increases have a negative effect on the employment composition of non-discriminated workers.  
These results are unique within the literature and thus force us to re-examine how minimum 
wage increases and enforcement affects discriminated sub-groups of the labor supply. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a simple model of 
noncompliance decisions of a firm with wage discrimination.  In Section 3, we present 
comparative statics of the model.  Further, we discuss implications of minimum wage law and 
enforcement for the sub-minimum wage and composition of labor employment.  Section 4 
contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We examine the employment decisions of a non-complying firm that is subject to the 
minimum wage law.  We consider the scenario in which the firm hires two types of workers, 
denoted as  1 L  and  2, L  who are identical in productivity but are different in demography.  To 
account for elements of worker discrimination à la Becker (1971) and Arrow (1972a, 1972b), we 
assume that the firm pays type-1 workers  1 () L  the statutorily determined minimum wage,  , M  
and type-2 workers  2 () L  a sub-minimum wage,  . w   In this case, type-1 workers are “favored” 
whereas type-2 workers are “non-favored” by the employer of the firm.  The wages of type-2 
workers are thus subject to discrimination.  To allow for discriminatory monopsony à la 
Robinson (1969), let labor supply of type-2 workers to the firm be given as  2 () , ww L = where 
2 /0 . wL ∂∂>  The production function of the firm is given as  12 () y fL L = + , which is strictly 
concave ( 12 '( ) 0 fL L +>  and  12 "( ) 0). fLL + <
1   
                                                 
1 As in Tobal (2005), we ignore the possibility that workers in one group have a distaste for working with those in 




 Under the minimum wage law, the non-complying behavior of the firm in paying type-2 
workers a sub-minimum is illegal.  Denote λ  as the probability that the firm is apprehended and 
punished for violating the minimum wage law.  The firm’s expected profit function is given as 
follows:
2 
12 1 2 2 2 2 () ( ) [( ) ] pfL L M L w LL k M w L L π λ =+ − − −−              (1) 
 
where  p  denotes competitive price of the firm’s output, k  represents the size of penalty for each 
unit of labor supplied by type-2 workers that is underpaid.
3 
  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for profit maximization are: 
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Equation (2) indicates that for an interior solution for  1(0 ) , L >  it is necessary that  
 
      12 () . pfL L M ′ + =                                  (4)  
  
The firm will not hire type-1 workers if the value of their marginal product of labor is less than 
the minimum wage.  Equation (3) indicates that for an interior solution for  2(0 ) , L >  the 
following condition must be satisfied: 
 
     12 2 2 2 ( )( 1 ) [() () ](). pfL L kw LL w L k M λ λ ′′ += − + +              (5) 
 
The terms on the right-hand side of equation (5) define the firm’s expected marginal cost of 
hiring type-2 workers, which is denoted as 
2 L MC .  This 
2 L MC  is given by the weighted sum of 
the marginal factor cost ( 2 MFC ),  22 [() ] , wLL w ′ +   and the statutory minimum,  , M with the 
weights being equal to (1 ) k λ −  and  , k λ  respectively.  Thus, if 
 
  
2 12 () , L pfL L M C ′ + <                                (6) 
then  2 0. L =   
It follows from conditions (4)-(6) that the firm will not hire type-2 workers if the 
intensity of law enforcement (defined as  k λ ) is such that  
 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that the non-complying firm is risk-neutral in that it maximizes expected profit when making its 
employment decisions.  For the case of a risk-averse firm under the minimum wage law see, e.g., Chang (1992). 
3 We assume that the firm’s output market is characterized by perfect competition.  For the case where the firm is the 
only seller in its output market, the firm has monopoly/monopsony power in both the output and labor markets.   
Booton and Lane (1985) found empirical support for the hypothesis that the wages of registered nurses are 
suppressed by the monopoly/monopsony power of local hospitals.  For cases of firms with oligopoly/oligopsony 




        22 2 ( 1 ) [() () ]() . kwLL w L k M M λ λ ′ −+ + >                       (7) 
 
Interestingly enough, the above inequality condition implies that 
 
                22 2 [() () ] , wLL w L M ′ + >                                (8) 
 
which is independent of enforcement intensity.  Thus, as long as the  2 MFC  is no greater than the 
minimum wage, the firm will hire type-2 workers. 
The second-order conditions (SOCs) for an interior solution ( 1 0 L >  and  2 L >0) require 
that the expected profit function in (1) be strictly concave or that the Jacobian matrix given 
below be strictly negative-definite. 
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Under the assumption of diminishing marginal productivities of labor (0 ) f ′′ < , the SOCs for 
interior solutions ( 1 0 L >  and  2 0 L > ) require that the intensity of law enforcement be  1. k λ <
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To explicitly characterize the discriminatory behavior of the non-complying employer, 
we consider the case of interior solutions for  1 L  and  2. L   By combining equations (4) and (5), we 
have  22 2 ( 1 ) [() () ] , M kwLL w L k M λ λ ′ =− + +  which can easily be rewritten as  
 
22 2 [ ( ) ( )]. M wLL w L ′ = +                        (9) 
 









=                       (10) 
 
where  22 (( ) ( ) B dL dw w L ε ≡   is the wage elasticity of labor supply by type-2 workers.   
Interestingly, the expression in (10) is consistent with the traditional optimality condition for 
                                                 
4  The literature on the economics of minimum wage compliance predicts that government minimum wage 
enforcement policy is ineffective in eliminating incentives of noncompliance either due to low expected penalties for 
violation or a small probability of detection and punishment.  In other words, minimum wage enforcement is weak 
such that  1. k λ <   See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), Chang and Ehrlich (1985), Chang (1992), 





5  The employment decisions of the violating firm are as follows.  
First, the firm use equation (10) to determine its demand for services by type-2 workers.  Second, 
the firm uses the marginal productivity condition in (4) to determine its demand for services by 
type-1 workers. 
Based on the above analyses, we have 
  
PROPOSITION 1: In a minimum-wage economy where law enforcement is low (1 ) k λ <  and a 
non-complying firm is capable of practicing discriminatory monopsony against a demographic 
group of workers, the wage differential between the non-favored and favored groups of workers 
is inversely related to the labor supply elasticity of the non-favored group.  The sub-minimum 
wage that the non-complying, discriminating firm chooses to pay is independent of the law 
enforcement intensity, however. 
 
3. A Comparative Static Analysis and Its Implications 
 
In this section, we discuss how the optimal employment decisions of the non-complying 
firm change in response to changes in the minimum wage and enforcement intensity level.  To do 
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noting that  22 2 2 (1 )[ ( ) 2 ( )] 0 Jp f k w L L w L λ ′′ ′′ ′ =− − + >  when  1. k λ <   From (11), it follows that  
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Thus, an increase in the minimum wage unambiguously increases the employment of type-2 
workers and reduces that of type-1 workers.   
What is the effect of an increase in minimum wage on total employment  12 () LLL =+  of 
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It is straightforward to show that an increase in the minimum wage raises the sub-
minimum wage of workers in the group subject to discrimination.  This is because  
                                                 
5 For the case in which there is only a homogeneous group of workers() L , a monopolistic firm hires labor that 
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It should come as no surprise that law enforcement intensity has no effect on labor decisions of 
the firm.  To see this, we have from the system in (11) that  
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given that   () 22 M wLL w ′ ⎡⎤ =+ ⎣⎦  in (9). 
  The findings of the above analyses allow us to establish the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: If a non-complying employer is able to practice discriminatory monopsony 
against a demographic group of workers in a minimum-wage economy, an increase in the 
minimum wage unambiguously raises the demand for labor services by the non-favored group.  
Consequently, the sub-minimum wage increases.  The minimum wage increase, however, not only 
reduces the employment of favored workers but also the total employment of the workers taken 
together.   
 
  It is instructive to use a diagrammatical approach to show the implications of the above 
analyses.  Figure 1 illustrates the composition of favored and non-favored workers hired by the 
non-complying firm.  The firm’s demand curve for labor is given by  12 '( ). L Dp f L L =+   The 
labor supply curve of type-2 workers is given by  2 () ww L =   which also defines the firm’s 
average factor cost ( 2 AFC ) curve.  The marginal factor cost curve corresponding to the labor 
supply curve is given by  2. MFC   When the minimum wage level is 
' M , the firm hires type-2 
workers up to 
'
2 L  at which 
' M =
'
22 () . MFC L   The sub-minimum wage that the firm pays type-2 
workers is determined by the 2 AFC  curve, i.e., 
'
2 () . ww L =   Apparently, the sub-minimum wage 
is lower than the statutory minimum.  At 
' M , the total number of workers that the firm hires is 
determined by its labor demand curve, i.e., 
'' '
12 '( ). M pf L L =+  
The composition of labor employment, 
''
12 {, } , LL  depends crucially on the level of the 
minimum wage.  An exogenous increase in the minimum wage has opposite effects on the two 
distinct types of workers.  On one hand, minimum wage increases lead the firm to hire more 
type-2 workers along the  2 MFC  curve (as shown by the arrowheads).  Increases in the sub-
minimum wage are along the  2 AFC  curve.  On the other hand, minimum wage increases lead the 
firm to reduce its employment of type-1 workers along the firm’s demand curve (as shown by the 
arrowheads).  For the case in which the minimum wage increases up to 
", M  the firm hires type-2 
workers, but not type-1 workers.  That is,  1 0 L =  and 
"
22 . LL =   For the level of minimum wage 
above 
" M , the firm starts to hire less type-2 workers.  Thus, when a firm is able to practice 
discriminatory monopsony against a sub-group of labor supply, minimum wage increases affect 




sub-minimum wage.  It turns out that increases in minimum wage work against favored workers 
and benefit non-favored workers, despite the fact that the latter are paid below the statutory 
minimum.    
Because profits of firms decrease as they comply with the minimum wage law, firms 
have an incentive for noncompliance (Chang and Ehrlich, 1985).
6  In our analysis, we further 
examine the case where non-complying firms may have “a taste of discrimination” (Becker, 
1971; Arrow, 1972a, 1972b) in that they desire to pay demographic groups of workers 
differential wages.  We find that the effect of minimum wage law on the composition of 
discriminated and non-discriminated workers depends crucially on the labor supply curve of the 
discriminated workers.  In our model, monopsonistic discrimination against a subset of workers 
constitutes a major cause of wage differentials.  Increases in minimum wage not only affect the 
between-group wage differentials but also the between-group labor employment.   
We further find that under partial compliance, minimum wage increases have a negative 
effect on total employment.  This finding complements the negative employment effect as found 
in Yaniv (2001), where a non-complying firm pays differential wages (a legal minimum and a 
sub-minimum) to fractions of employed workers.  Yaniv (2001) indicates that, despite partial 
compliance, a minimum wage law may reduce total employment to a level that is equivalent to 
the negative employment effect when the firm fully complies with the law.  It should be 
mentioned that partial compliance in Yaniv’s analysis arises from a portfolio-choice 
consideration, while that in our analysis stems from employer wage discrimination related to 
monopolistic power.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we present a model to characterize the discriminatory behavior of a non-
complying employer in a minimum-wage economy.  In the analysis of partial compliance, 
workers in the favored group receive the minimum wage, whereas workers in the non-favored 
group receive a sub-minimum.  For the case in which minimum wage enforcement is weak, law 
enforcement is shown to be ineffective in improving wage differentials between demographically 
different groups of workers.  We provide an explanation of how increases in minimum wage may 
lead a profit-maximizing discriminating firm to raise sub-minimum wages for and employment 
of non-favored workers.  Nevertheless, minimum wage increases unambiguously reduce total 
employment of workers. 
It should be mentioned that in our simple analysis, we do not examine issues related to 
the optimal enforcement of the minimum wage law.  Further, we abstract from the possibility of 
legal resources on the part of a sub-minimum wage worker.  A more general framework is 
required that is capable of taking into account the design of an enforcement scheme in terms of 
the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment.  Moreover, efficient allocations 
of socially costly enforcement resources to detecting firms that are more likely to violate the law 
are interesting issues for future research. 
                                                 
6 The incentives not to comply with the minimum wage law increases with the discrepancy between the wage that a 
violating firm desires to pay his workers and the legal minimum wage.  Chang and Ehrlich further remark that “a 
minimum wage enforcement policy requiring the violating firm to pay only a fraction of the difference between the 
statutory minimum and the market wage per unit labor will not constitute an effective deterrent” (p. 87).  For studies 
on public enforcement of laws see, e.g., Stigler (1970) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000). 




Figure 1.  Effects of minimum wage increases on the composition of 
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